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The Epistemic Blindness of White Solipsism

Mason Majszak, Loyola University Chicago
Abstract
This paper focuses on a specific type of knowledge, this being the type of knowledge that
allows for the ability of an individual to know another person. I analyzed Shannon Sullivan’s
book Revealing Whiteness: The Unconscious Habits of Racial Privilege to gain insight into an
individuals ability to know another person. Within the text, I concentrated on the first chapter
“Ignorance and Habit”, and the argument Sullivan articulates in this chapter. This argument
is in regard to the consequence of what Sullivan describes as white solipsism and how it can
cause unconscious habits. To better display Sullivan’s argument, I used the epistemic framework
articulated in Bernard Lonergan’s cognitional theory and his three stages of knowing. These stages
of Experience, Understanding, and Judging, were used to explain how white solipsism could affect
a white person’s ability as a knower in the first stage of Experience. From this, I described how
white solipsism causes the inability of a white person to have knowledge of people of different
racial backgrounds from themselves. Ultimately, I conclude that white solipsism causes white
people to have false knowledge because they are no longer looking for new experiences and that
white solipsism causes ignorance and epistemic blindness regarding alternate viewpoints.
Introduction
How am I to know another person outside of myself? This paper focuses on a
specific type of knowledge, this being the type of knowledge that allows for the ability of an
individual to know another person. To do this I analyzed Shannon Sullivan’s book Revealing
Whiteness: The Unconscious Habits of Racial Privilege. I concentrated on the first chapter,
“Ignorance and Habit”, as well as the argument Sullivan articulates in this chapter. This argument
is in regard to the consequence of what Sullivan describes as white solipsism and how it can cause
unconscious habits. From this, I used Bernard Lonergan’s cognitional theory, his three stages of
knowing, to explain how white solipsism can affect a white person’s ability as a knower. In light
of this, I show that white solipsism causes white people to view their views as the only important
viewpoint. A habitual form of white solipsism can then be seen to affect the actions of white people
and their understanding of the world. In light of this, I demonstrate that white solipsism limits
perception and from this can be considered an epistemic vice in the stage of Experience. Due to
white solipsism being an epistemic vice, I show that white people are not good knowers of people
of different racial backgrounds from themselves. Ultimately, I conclude that this vice causes white
people to have false knowledge because they are no longer looking for new experiences and that
white solipsism causes ignorance and epistemic blindness regarding alternate viewpoints.
Three Stages of Knowing
To begin my discussion of knowledge, I will lay out a framework for how we, as knowers,
can come to knowledge. To do this, I will describe Bernard Lonergan’s three stages of knowing to
serve as my framework. For Lonergan the three stages of knowing are Experience, Understanding
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and Judging, with the stages occurring in that order. The first stage of Experience can be seen as
the individual knower going out into the world and perceive things, gathering information. This
gathering of information is done through, “seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, tasting, inquiring…”
(Lonergan 1971, p. 6). Lonergan’s second stage is Understanding, when “our consciousness
expands in a new dimension when from mere experiencing we turn to the effort to understand
what we have experienced” (9). The knower must look at all the data and information they have
collected and attempt to bring it together and try to make sense of what they have experienced.
Finally, the knower must reflect on what they have brought together, the knower must decide if
they hold the idea to be true; this is our third stage of knowing, the stage of Judging. This shows
that knowing is not a static entity, that is given to someone, but for Lonergan is rather a dynamic
process that a knower partakes in.
Due to knowing being a dynamic process, there is one major implication. This implication
is that knowing like any process can either be done poorly or well. In light of the implication of
individuals being better or poorer knowers, I ask one question. Simply, how can we be better or
poorer knowers? To answer this question, I will introduce the concept of epistemic virtues and
epistemic vices in reference to Lonergan’s stages of knowing. Before discussing the epistemic
virtues for Lonergan, I will first define the notion of virtue.
Epistemic Virtue
To define virtue, we will turn to Linda Zagzebski and her book titled On Epistemology. In
the text, Zagzebski defines virtue as “an acquired human excellence that includes a characteristic
emotion disposition and reliable success at bringing about the end of the acts motivated by the
emotion in question” (Zagzebski 2009, p. 81). This definition can be broken down into three
distinct characteristics of virtue. In the first part of the definition, Zagzebski states that virtue is
“an acquired human excellence”. From this notion of a virtue being acquired, we can conclude
that virtue is something an individual must work at and practice. Now, if we are to acquire a virtue
through practice, the virtue must become habitual since an individual must do it constantly. In light
of this, it can be concluded that our actions define us as individuals because they form our habits.
Next Zagzebski states that virtue “includes a characteristic emotion disposition” (81). What this
means is that there is an emotional reaction by the person who is acting out the virtue. This is the
emotional feeling or reaction that comes after the action of the virtue. An example would be that
after you act out the virtue you think or reflect upon yourself, “I like doing this action, it comes
easy to me.” Finally, the last characteristic of virtue is made clear when Zagzebski states that virtue
has “reliable success at bringing about the end of the acts motivated by the emotion” (81). This
notion of “reliable success” and “bringing about the end” can be seen as a cognitive element or a
skill in judging how best to use the virtue. We must judge if the action in question will bring about
the desired end of the emotion or habit and if we can reliably judge the action to bring about the
success. An example of this would be: we must judge if jumping into a pool to save a drowning
person would be the courageous thing to do. We must judge if we are good enough swimmers to
pull the person out of the water, or if we are simply dooming ourselves and the other person to
drowning in the pool. From all of these parts, we can state that the three components of virtue are:
it must be habitual, there is an emotional component and there is some cognitive judgment that
must be made.
For Lonergan, there are multiple virtues and vices that are specific for each stage of
knowing. To better explain the idea of how the virtues and vices affect a knower, I will use an
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example of two students working on a problem. Let’s say you are student A and you are working
on an assignment with student B. This assignment requires you and your partner to work together
to answer a multiple-choice question. Before starting this assignment, you overheard from other
classmates that student B is incredibly intelligent and is never wrong. For this situation, you have
collected all the relevant information regarding the topic for which you will answer the multiplechoice question and understand it perfectly, meaning you have completed the first two stages of
knowing without any problems. Now it is time for you and your partner to put down your answer,
and your partner feels that the answer is C. You decide to agree with your partner without judging
for yourself because the individual you are working with is believed to be smart by your other
classmates. This is an example of an epistemic vice for the stage of judging; you are looking to an
authority and not thinking for yourself, regarding the answer’s validity. The opposite of this action
would be the epistemic virtue, that of autonomy or the ability to think for oneself.
This example illustrates that when an individual partakes in either an epistemic vice
or a virtue they affect the way their knowing is done. The individual can be a good knower by
engaging in an epistemic virtue or a poor knower by engaging in an epistemic vice. Now that I
have articulated the stages of knowing for Lonergan and how someone can come to knowledge, I
look to a new text to discuss how Sullivan describes the epistemic blindness of white people and
how this blindness may stop the knowing process.
White Solipsism
For Sullivan, the epistemic blindness of white people is rooted in the notion of white
solipsism. Sullivan states:
[…] white solipsism is a real problem. In many people’s day-to-day lives, it can
seem as if only white people exist. While the literal existence of people of color
may be acknowledged, such acknowledgement often occurs on an abstract level
that produces ethical solipsism in which only white values, interests, and needs are
considered important and worthy of attention. (Sullivan 2006, p. 17)
To better describe this passage, I will break it down into multiple sections. I will start with the first
full sentence were Sullivan states, “in many people’s day-to-day lives, it can seem as if only white
people exist” (17). What Sullivan is articulating is the segregation of people by race in cities and
across nations. We can see this in one of the largest cities in the United States, Chicago. There
are portions of the city, like South Chicago, that are predominantly if not entirely of the racial
minority with 75% being Black and 20% being Hispanic (Statistical Atlas 1). Conversely, there are
portions of Chicago, such as Lincoln Park, that are predominantly white, almost 82% (Statistical
Atlas 2). What this means is that the likelihood that a white person in Lincoln Park will see another
white person is very high, but the likelihood of a white person in Lincoln Park seeing a Black or
Hispanic person is very low. In light of these statistics, it is easy to see how Sullivan can come to
the notion that in many white people’s lives they are able to go about their day-to-day activities
only encountering and engaging with other white people.
The final part of the passage that is of interest is when Sullivan states, “while the
literal existence of people of color may be acknowledged, such acknowledgement often occurs on
an abstract level that produces ethical solipsism in which only white values, interests, and needs
are considered important and worthy of attention” (Sullivan 2006, p. 17). Sullivan is describing
how even though white people know people of other racial backgrounds exist this knowledge of
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mere existence is the extent of their knowledge regarding these individuals. Sullivan is stating that
white people only know of racial minorities by description, this would be a kind of I-it knowledge,
or a simple knowledge of existence that Martin Buber describes in his book I and Thou. For Buber
this is the type of knowledge one would have of an object, knowing it only in its relation to oneself.
An example being I only know of the lamp sitting in the corner of the room by its relation to me,
I don’t know if it has thoughts or feelings or any concerns. I only know that it is about 5 feet from
me, that it takes us physical space and it is not in any apparent motion.
Sullivan’s argument continues this I-it notion through the description of the relationship
white people have with racial minorities. Since white people don’t think of racial minorities,
because the white people do not see them, the minorities can simply be considered as an external
object, like the lamp in the corner. From this, the external racial group is then not considered to
have interests or concerns and in turn white people only view their own concerns as important
and disregard the other. This reducing and eliminating of the concerns of others brings about the
creation of white solipsism, the experience that there is only one possible viewpoint, the viewpoint
of white people.
For white people this white solipsism can lead to the idea that their way of experiencing the
world is the only way to experience the world. Sullivan continues this idea and shows the effects
this can have in the creation of a racial habit. She does this by expanding on the concept of W.E.B
Du Bois, the notion of unconscious habit. This notion is described by Du Bois as the idea that
“much of human behavior is guided by irrational unconscious habits” (qtd. in Sullivan 2006, p.
21). What Du Bois is saying is that our habits guide us and guides our actions potentially without
our awareness of them. This means that there is a basic framework we are operating under that
affects our actions and we may not be aware of the framework’s existence.
Sullivan expands on this idea when she states, “as an instance of habit, race often functions
subconsciously, as a predisposition for acting in the world that is not consciously chosen or planned”
(25). This means that we not only have an unconscious habit, but also a racial habit that affects the
way we behave in the world without our knowledge. In light of this, it can be seen that, due to our
racial background, we have some habits that affect the way we move and experience the world.
Given this, we can expand the idea of white solipsism and see it as an unconscious racial
habit. Sullivan does this by using an example of a college class. She describes how the racial
habits for white people are praised in this college environment, where raising one’s hand and
having the conversation dictated by the professor is encouraged. She goes on to show how this
habit of raising one’s hand contrasts the racial habits for black people where “people tend to value
individual regulation of when turns are taken”, which is seen as rude and interruptive in the college
environment (28). To explain the meaning of this example Sullivan gives us a hint into what she
was thinking by stating, “my descriptions of racial habit should be read as an illustration of some
of the ways by which habits of communication in the classroom racialize (and class) both the space
of education and the habits of those being educated” (29).
This, on the surface, shows that the two contrasting forms of communication are important
and that the overall setting is important. If we dive deeper, we can see in what sense each of
these two aspects are important. This example shows us that these unconscious racial habits affect
the way the professor perceives the students. Additionally, the setting of the college classroom
was created using white solipsism, meaning that it was created under the framework that there is
only one way to ask question or conduct conversation. In the example the white students would
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automatically be seen as performing the right action because the environment views the white
students actions as good. This perceived good action originates from the fact that the action is in
line with the unconscious racial habit. This is the opposite case with the black student, where their
actions would be viewed as rude even though the student is operating in a perfectly good way
based on their own racial habit. This illustrates an immediate difference in the way a teacher would
perceive the white student versus the black student. From this, we can state that white solipsism,
white people believing that their way is the only way, is a framework or an unconscious racial habit
that white people are operating under.
Now I will look at how white solipsism limited the ability of the professor to accurately
perceive the student of a different racial background and the implications of white solipsism. I
will use Lonergan’s cognitional theory to help articulate what is exactly happening during white
solipsism, in terms of epistemology. We showed that white solipsism does not allow white people
to perceive the world accurately and gain all relevant information. For Lonergan the gaining
of all relevant information is a characteristic that is required for good knowing in the stage of
Experience. From this, I argue that white solipsism causes white people to be bad knowers of
people of different racial backgrounds because the solipsism hinders an aspect of their knowing.
In light of white solipsism causing white people to be bad knowers, it can be concluded that white
solipsism is an epistemic vice in the stage of experience.
One could argue that for white people to engage in an epistemic vice they would have to
actively know they were doing so. I argue, rather, that white people can engage in white solipsism
without them knowing that they are partaking in the vice because it is an unconscious habit, as
shown before. Due to the fact that white people are partaking in this epistemic vice we must now
conclude that they have not completed this stage of knowing, Experience. Meaning that regardless
of how well white people conduct the other two stages of knowing, Understanding and Judgment,
they are still considered bad knowers because of their use of this epistemic vice in the first stage
of knowing.
This raises the question, what are the ramifications of being a bad knower? Sullivan
answers this question of the ramifications in her discussion of how bad knowing caused by habits
can affect our ability to gain knowledge. Sullivan states, “thought as unconscious, the concept
of habit demonstrates how habits often are deviously obstructionist, actively blocking the self’s
attempts to transform itself for the better” (44). This means that bad habits can obstruct our ability
to grow because they influence our future actions. If we recognize, however, a current action as
something we don’t want to do in the future we should change the current habit to influence the
future actions. This is easy enough to change when you know what the habit and actions are, you
make the conscious effort to do the opposite. The problem is when you have a bad, unconscious
habit, it can be almost impossible to change the actions because you have no idea that the actions
are bad or that you even want to change the habit.
With an in-depth look into this passage, it can be seen as an explanation of how these
habits create a positive feedback cycle in white people’s inability to attain knowledge. White
people are blocked from originally perceiving all of the necessary information due to the epistemic
vice of white solipsism, this is our bad habit. This, in turn, causes white people to feel they have
knowledge even when there are errors in the process of their knowing. Further, they are unable to
see the error because this white solipsism is an unconscious habit that white people are unaware of.
Now, because white people feel that they already have adequate knowledge on the subject
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of other racial groups they have no drive to acquire any other new information in an attempt to
correct themselves. Thus, showing the difficulty of overcoming a bad unconscious habit. This, in
turn, creates a white ignorance to all ideas that are non-white. This ignorance does not allow an
individual to “transform itself for the better” because they are blocked by their incorrect belief that
they have true knowledge (44). From this, we can conclude that white solipsism causes epistemic
blindness for white people which, in turn, causes white ignorance and a cognitive block for white
people to have accurate knowledge of people of other racial backgrounds.
I have shown that white solipsism causes white people to view their views as the only
important viewpoint. From this, I illustrated how habitual white solipsism affects the actions of
white people and their understanding of the world. In light of this, I demonstrated that white
solipsism limits perception and from this can be considered an epistemic vice in the stage of
Experience. Due to white solipsism being an epistemic vice, I showed that white people are not
good knowers of people of different racial backgrounds from themselves. From this, I concluded
that this vice causes white people to have false knowledge because they are no longer looking for
the experiences and that white solipsism causes ignorance and epistemic blindness.
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